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CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT  
TO SOCIAL SECURITY IN SLOVENIA*
1. Introduction 
The right to social security is recognised as one of the fundamental human rights in 
international1 and European Union (EU)2 law. It is also enshrined in many national con-
stitutions, including the Slovenian one. As such, it cannot be regulated as a very precise 
and concrete legal rule. It is one of the basic values and guidance for all legal subjects in 
a society.
The content of the right to social security is rather open and there might be no direct 
correlation between the constitutional provisions and concrete rights stemming from the 
social security system. Hence, the right to social security has to be determined foremost 
by the national legislator, by regulating individual social security rights of insured per-
sons (and other beneficiaries). National legislator is bound to respect minimum standards 
of international law and constitutional guarantees.
It could be argued that the Slovenian Constitution is a modern one. It was passed at 
the beginning of 1990-ties3 and incudes the social state principle as well as fundamental 
social rights. Among them is the right to social security, which gained importance during 
the times of economic recession.
In order to comprehend the complexity and the meaning of the constitutional provi-
sions, interpretations of the Constitutional Court have to be taken into account. Also the 
right to social security is construed by the Court, which has to determine the constitu-
* This article has been previously published in The Right to Social Security in the Constitutions of the 
World. Broadening the Moral and Legal Space for Social Justice (ed. M. Wujczyk), Geneva 2016.
1  See Articles 22 and 25 of the Universal declaration of human rights, Article 9 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12 of the European Social Charter (ESC) and the 
revised ESC. For defining the content of the right to social security the ILO Convention No. 102 concerning 
minimum standards of social security has to be applied. Similar obligations arise also from the European Code 
of Social Security.
2  The right to social security (and social assistance) is enshrined in Art 34 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, OJ C 83/389, 30. 3. 2010. See also other articles of this Charter which may 
influence the content of the right to social security, e.g. Articles 1 (Human dignity), 20 and 21 (equality and non-
discrimination), 23 (gender equality), 24 (the rights of a child), 25 (the rights of the elderly), 26 (Integration 
of persons with disabilities), 35 (the right to health care), 36 (access also to social services of general interest).
3  Official Journal RS, No. 33/1991-I, last amendment in 47/2013.
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tional core of the right to social security that cannot be invaded by the legislator. By doing 
so, the delimitation between social and private risks can be drawn. Especially during the 
times of economic recession the question, which is not really new, can emerge, i.e. who 
is responsible for providing income security when one of the traditional social risks or 
a specific situation of need occurs. Is it the duty of legal subjects (natural and juridical 
persons) governed by civil law, i.e. the individual him/herself, his/her family or his/her 
employer, or is it the responsibility of legal persons governed by public law, i.e. the State, 
local communities and public institutes.
Moreover, when shaping the legal position of an individual in a concrete case, not 
only decisions of the Constitutional Court, but also case-law of international courts of law 
and especially highest national courts is of the greatest importance. Due to very specific 
subject matter of social disputes, specialised (labour and) social courts have been estab-
lished in Slovenia.4
In order to analyse the more general constitutional right to social security or more 
concrete individual social security rights, it is important to define what can be understood 
under social security. In more general terms social security is a public system of income 
protection in case of its loss or reduction (e.g. due to old age, invalidity, decease, accident 
at work or occupational disease, sickness, maternity or unemployment) or increased costs 
(e.g. for health care, raising of children or long-term care services), organised through a 
process of (broader or narrower) social solidarity.5
In international and EU law there is a clear distinction between social security and 
social assistance,6 also due to historical differences between subjective and enforceable 
social security rights and more discretionary right to social assistance. The Slovenian 
Constitution was inspired by the international documents and social assistance is not 
mentioned as part of social security. Nevertheless, the distinction between social secu-
rity and social assistance has become more fluid, since elements of minimum (social 
assistance) protection can also be found in social security (in Slovenia predominately 
exercised by social insurances), and social assistance has become a subjective and en-
forceable right (although, some discretion has remained). Hence, the Slovenian legislator 
includes social assistance in the national social security system. Since there is no codifi-
cation of social security law, the only legislative act, speaking of social security system is 
the Labour and Social Courts Act.
Focus of the present article is on the general constitutional guarantees in the form 
of constitutional social state, equality and rule of law principles and fundamental social 
rights. It is especially important to analyse the interpretation of the constitutional provi-
sions by the Constitutional Court, and its impact on social security rights. This might be 
of utmost importance also during the economic recession, when social security are being 
more often challenged and modified.
4  Labour and Social Courts Act (Zakon o delovnih in socialnih sodiščih-ZDSS–1), Official Journal RS, 
No. 2/2004.
5  Strban, 2010/2011, p. 356. See also Pieters, 2006, p. 2.
6  For instance, the ILO Convention no. 102 contains no provisions on social assistance, In the European 
Social Charter Article 12 is regulating the right to social security and Art. 13 the right to social and medical 
assistance.
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2. Slovenia as a social State
There are several constitutional provisions, which are rather important for shaping 
the social security system and limiting the legislator when he wishes to reduce the (per-
sonal and/or material) scope of social security rights. First, the general constitutional 
principle of Slovenia being a social State has to be mentioned.
Many national constitutions entail the social state principle. In some it has been sub-
ject to a very dynamic interpretation7 and in others the interpretation has been rather re-
served. In Slovenia its meaning has been explained by the Slovenian Constitutional Court 
and legal theory, although, to far lesser extent than the principle of the state governed by 
the rule of law.
Both, social state and the rule of law principles are regulated in the same article of the 
Constitution.8 It has to be established, that this is no coincidence. Both are constitutional 
values, giving the state and the law a comprehensive and binding social policy task.9 The 
Constitution makes it clear that Slovenia is a social state governed by the rule of law, In 
other words, it is normative social state, which provides security and dignity of each per-
son with legal regulation and within limits of the law.10 It is distinct from welfare state, 
which is realised especially within family and civil society.11 
Therefore, social nature of the Slovenian State cannot be perceived only as a pro-
grammatic, legally non-binding norm. It is a State goal, legally binding for all branches of 
State power.12 According to the rule of law principle, constitutional provisions are legally 
binding for the legislative, executive and judicial power. The legislator has freedom to 
(re)shape more concrete social security rights, obligations and legal relations only within 
the constitutional framework and according to the criteria set therein.13 However, due to 
its general nature, social state principle could hardly be directly applied by the executive 
and judicial branches of State power. Thus, it is foremost binding for the legislator,14 
which has to accommodate the obligations arising from the social state principle.15
There is also no coincidence, that the principles of social state and the rule of law 
are regulated at the very beginning of the Slovenian Constitution, among the general 
provisions, showing basic values of the Slovenian society. Such placement indicates their 
priority over other constitutional provisions, including the so called golden rule of fiscal 
 7  For instance in Germany the Sozialstaatsprinzip has been very dynamically interpreted, with its prin-
ciples of social justice, social equality and social security. Extensively, Zacher, 1993/1.
 8  Article 2 of the Slovenian Constitution.
 9  Zacher, 1993/2, p. 279.
10  On the development of the modern state governed by the rule of law, which is regulating social rela-
tions and promoting its citizens and social democracy (inspired by the Napoleon III, Extinction du pauperisme, 
1844), Eichenhofer, 2000, p. 18.
11  Bubnov Škoberne, Strban, 2010, p. 29.
12  Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court No. Up–39/94, 4.04.1995, OdlUS IV, 147.
13  Slovenia is a State governed by the rule of law (Article 2 of the Constitution). Additionally, the 
legislator (Article 153), the state administration (Article 120) and judiciary (Article 125) are bound by the 
Constitution.
14  Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court No. 282/94, 18.10.1995, OdlUS IV, 108.
15  Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court No. U-I–13/13, 14.11.2013, Official Journal RS, 
No. 98/2013.
256 Grega Strban
policy, which has been introduced in the Slovenian constitution in 2013.16 In the event of 
possible collision the priority should be awarded to the basic constitutional values, among 
them to the (normative) social state principle.
The constitutional review from the viewpoint of the social state principle is tradition-
ally very cautious and reserved. The Constitutional Court leaves a wide field of discretion 
to the legislator in choosing the most appropriate type and content of a measure, used to 
implement the social state principle.17
In its decisions, the Constitutional Court usually links the social state principle with 
other constitutional provisions. On several occasions it has linked it with fundamental 
social rights, also the right to social security.18 The social state principle has so far not 
been subject to a very dynamic interpretation by the Slovenian Constitutional Court. Only 
one sub-principle has been mentioned so far, i.e. the principle of solidarity, the content of 
which was not precisely defined either.19
2.1. Solidarity
Solidarity is the most important characteristic of social state and social security sys-
tem as such. It is differentia specifica between social and private insurance (where certain 
reciprocity between insured persons may exist, but solidarity is as a rule absent).
Some argue that the notion solidarity stems from the Roman law, more precisely from 
obligatio in solidum (Latin phrase that means in total or on the whole). It regulates the 
situation, when two or more debtors vouch for the entire (total or whole) obligation of one 
of them.20 In the times of the French revolution (1789) its slogan of liberty, equality and 
brotherhood (fr. liberté, égalité, fraternité) was developed. These values were incorporat-
ed also in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In its first Article we can read that 
all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. In 
the times of gender equality, it would be only equitable to add also in the spirit of sister-
hood, or maybe a more general term of solidarity could be used (instead of brotherhood).
The notion of solidarity has gradually evolved in the French civil law (fr. solidarité). 
Later on in Catholic social ethics, solidarity was founded on charity and in social phi-
losophy on nationality, since it reflected the idea of the nation as the great community in 
solidarity.21 Some define solidarity broader, as friendship on collective level,22 without 
limiting it to nationality. Others use solidarity when defining the measures of justice. An 
expression of justice is also solidarity justice, measure of which is each according to his/
16  Article 148 of the Slovenian Constitution.
17  Decisions of the Slovenian Constitutional Court Nos. U-I–310/96, 5.02.01998, OdlUS VII, 24, and 
U-I–128/97, 6. 4. 2000, OdlUS IX, 79.
18  Decision of the Slovenian Constitutional Court No. U-I–338/96, 9.12.1999, OdlUS VIII, 277.
19  Decisions Nos. U-I–137/03, 26. 5. 2005, OdlUS, XIV, 30, and U-I–36/00, 11.12.2003, OdlUS XII, 98.
20  Kranjc, 2010, p. 545.
21  Becker, 2007, p. 1.
22  Kranjc, 2009, p. 92.
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her needs.23 This is most visible when the scope of sickness benefits in kind (health care) 
is determined. Medical benefits are not dependent on income or property or the level of 
contribution paid by the insured person. They are granted according the needs of health 
situation of each patient.24 So solidarity is expressed between healthy and sick insured per-
sons. It is a form of horizontal solidarity, where a measure is not the level of income, but 
other personal circumstance, next to sickness or health also gender or family situation.25
Solidarity has gained importance also in the EU law, where it is expressly mentioned. 
The EU Treaty emphasises the values, which are common to all member states26 in a 
society characterised not only by pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, equal-
ity between women and men, but also solidarity. Among distinctive forms of solidarity, 
solidarity between generations is stressed and should be promoted.27
Moreover, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which has the same legal 
value as the Treaties, explicitly mentions solidarity as an indivisible and universal value 
of the Union.28 In a special chapter, titled Solidarity, the Charter regulates the rights do so-
cial security, social assistance and health care.29 Although the Charter does not introduce 
new competencies of the EU,30 it is an important guidance in interpretation of the EU law, 
also by the Court of Justice of the EU.31
Solidarity in a more specific sense also plays a role when it comes to the influence 
of basic economic freedoms and the EU competition law on national social security sys-
tems. According to the Court of Justice of the EU, systems based on solidarity (or carriers 
of such systems) cannot be qualified as undertakings and are exempted from the applica-
tion of competition law.32
Solidarity constitutes a core principle of European social security and unites Eu-
ropean national constitutions by their shared values. It is laid down as an express legal 
norm in many constitutions.33 In Slovenia, the Constitutional Court on several occasions 
mentioned solidarity between persons with higher and those with lower income (so called 
vertical solidarity) in parental care insurance.34 Similarly, it decided that the legislator 
23  Pavčnik, 2001, p. 11
24  Strban, 2005, p. 160.
25  For instance, women could purely technically present a higher risk, since they use hospital services 
when giving birth, also children may be insured as family members, without additional contributions.
26  The values are human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights. Arti-
cle 2 of the EU Treaty UL C 326, 26. 10 2012 (consolidated version).
27  Article 3 of the EU Treaty.
28  Second paragraph of the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
29  Title IV, Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
30  Article 6 of the EU Treaty and Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
31  For instance C–34/09 Zambrano [2011] I–01177 or C-570/10 Kamberaj, ECLI:EU:C:2012:233. 
Solidarity is expressly mentioned in Case C-140/12 Brey, ECLI:EU:C:2013:565.
32  More in cases C–159/91 and C–160/91 Poucet et Pistre [1993] ECR I–637, but also in some later 
cases like C–437/09 AG2R Prévoyance [2011] ECR I–973. C–350/07 Kattner Stahlbau [2009] ECR I–1513 or 
in the field of social security of migrant workers C–345/09 van Delft et al. [2010] ECR I–9879.
33  For instance, in Austria, Italy, Spain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, the solidarity principle is 
at any rate invoked to establish and legitimate the existence of social insurance. Becker, 2007, p. 1.
34  It established that limiting (to both ends) the calculation basis for the parental benefit is grounded in 
the principle of solidarity (decision No. U-I–137/03, 26.05.2005, OdlUS XIV, 30).
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followed the solidarity principle when determining the lowest and the highest pension 
calculation base. It stressed that acknowledgment of this principle does not oppose the 
social state principle and also not from it deriving right to social security.35
The Constitutional Court explicitly mentioned the intergenerational solidarity, i.e. 
solidarity between younger (active) and older (retired) generations.36 Also the longer du-
ration of the right to unemployment benefit for elderly insured persons was found to be in 
accordance with the Constitution, since it reflects the principle of solidarity.37
Next to that the expression of social or societal solidarity was used in a concurring 
opinion of one of the Constitutional Court judges.38 It was argued that the constitutional 
right to a pension is secured in a system that should enable social welfare and certain 
standard of living in a country, according to the principle of social solidarity. In another 
case solidarity between family members was taken as a basic starting point. The Consti-
tutional Court argued that when the legislator decides to completely replace the family 
solidarity with social solidarity, it has to ensure such solidarity.39
Sometimes the principle of mutuality is mentioned next to the principle of solidarity. 
They are not entirely overlapping principles. The Constitutional Court argued that social 
insurance is insurance which is not completely based on the principle of mutuality, but 
also on the principle of solidarity.40 Mutuality as distribution of an insured risk to an in-
surance community, especially if all are equally at risk, may be characteristic of private 
insurances. Social insurances are guided by the principle of solidarity, which covers per-
sons with different levels of risk and distributes burdens among them.41
Therefore, social insurance has to be mandatory. It is the only way to establish rela-
tions between persons who present a higher (social) risk with those who present a lower 
(social) risk. In may sound as a paradox, but due to such coercion (and mandatory pooling 
of risks) both groups may enjoy more freedom. An individual would be willing to engage 
in more risky activities, if he/she would be confident that there is a legally regulated so-
cial security system guaranteeing certain rights in case of sicknesses or injury, unemploy-
ment, old-age, invalidity or to the family members in case of decease.
2.2. Social justice
It could be argued that next to solidarity and social security (analysed under next 
point), also social justice is among the basic emanations of the social state principle. So-
cial justice is also at the core of the oldest specialised organisation of the United Nations, 
i.e. already in the year 1919 founded International Labour Organisation (ILO). The ILO 
received the Nobel peace prize at the occasion of its 50 years of existence in 1969. On that 
occasion, Mrs. Aase Lionaes, Chairman of the Nobel Committee, stated that beneath the 
35  Constitutional Court decision No. U-I–36/00, 11.12.2003, OdlUS XII, 98.
36  Constitutional Court decision No. U-I–6/03, 19.05.2005, not published.
37  Constitutional Court decision No. U-I–282/94, 18.10.1995, OdlUS IV, 108.
38  To the decision No. U-I–281/09, 22.11.2011, OdlUS XIX, 29.
39  Constitutional Court decision No. U-I–11/07, 13.12.2007, OdlUS XVI, 86.
40  For instance decision of the Constitutional Court No. U-I–137/03, 26.05.2005, OdlUS, XIV, 30.
41  Strban, 2013/1, p. 346.
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foundation stone of the ILO′s main office in Geneva lies a document on which is written: 
Si vis pacem, cole justitiam – If you desire peace, cultivate justice.42 ILO is therefore op-
posing the old military tradition, which is loyal to the maxim Si vis pacem, para bellum 
(if you want peace, prepare for war).
ILO is endeavouring to achieve universal and lasting peace, which can only be es-
tablished, if it is based on social justice.43 Social justice and social (security) rights are 
inevitably linked, since social justice can hardly be achieved without social rights. They 
are based on the presumption of principal equality of everyone and belief that optimisa-
tion of individual benefit does not necessary guarantee the highest social benefit.44
Discussion on social justice is not only discussion on the role of the State in the soci-
ety that is based on free economic initiative45, it is also discussion on the legal position of 
an individual. It can be appealing to promote freedom as living from other independent 
live, in which the State should not intrude or its regulation should be reduced to a mini-
mum. Reducing social security benefits (in cash and in kind) means less public revenue 
and expenditures, less redistribution and less social rights. Within this idea it is advocated 
that individual should dispose with more income, whereby private spending (within or 
outside the country) is promoted, demand and working places guaranteed. Less State 
should be not only more equitable, but also more efficient. In Slovenia there is an ongo-
ing discussion on introducing the cap on social security contributions (paying them only 
from certain amount and higher income would be contribution free). Advantage would be 
given to persons with higher income, who would have to be privately insured in order to 
protect their position, and vertical solidarity would be reduced.46
Advocates of social justice promote increased role of the state, more social (security) 
benefits and higher public expenditure. The State is not only responsible to protect the 
rights of an individual, but equal freedom of all and thereby social peace. Social inequal-
ity may lead to distinctive forms of inequality, and divides the society. Reduction of 
social rights may disproportionally affect the most vulnerable groups in the society (like 
sick, elderly, disabled persons and children) and deepens social inequalities. In Slovenia 
there is an in depth discussion on equal access of medical treatment outside of Slovenia 
(in another EU member state), is it guaranteed to all or just those who can afford it.
Discussion on social justice reveals that social justice is not very precisely defined 
notion, which can be subject to distinctive interpretations. Nevertheless, there is no 
doubt, that more social (security) rights, which are adjusted to distinctive legal position 
of person in the country, may increase social justice. It would be wrong to presume that 
economic outcome and social justice are mutually excluding concepts. Economic and 
social policy should promote not only economic growth, which can be the basis for social 
redistribution, but also social justice.47
42  The entire Award Ceremony Speech is accessible at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/
laureates/1969/press.html, May 2014.
43  ILO Constitution (1919) and ILO Declaration of Philadelphia (1944).
44  Eichenhofer, 2012, p. 10.
45  Article 74 of the Slovenian Constitution is advocating free enterprise.
46  Strban, 2013/2, p. 3.
47  Ibid.
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3. Fundamental social rights
The Slovenian Constitution enshrines not only the social state principle, but also fun-
damental social rights, among them the right to social security. It is situated in the second 
part of the Constitution under Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This means 
that it enjoys equal legal status as other human rights, including civil and political rights. 
This implies that the way the right to social security is exercised has to be determined 
by legislative acts, it has to be guaranteed equally to all, regardless of their personal 
circumstances, and there has to be a possibility of judicial review. The right to appeal, 
when deciding on social security rights, and the right to constitutional complaint have to 
be guaranteed.
3.1. Personal and material scope of the right to social security
Personal scope of the constitutional right to social security is restricted to citizens, 
i.e. to Slovenian citizens. This might be contested. Foreign citizens, legally or even ha-
bitually residing in Slovenia and employed there are not expressly protected. However, 
it is argued that such a provision might be justified, if it is construed in the manner that 
Constitution only provides minimum protection, which might be restricted to nationals. 
However, the legislator is free to extend the personal scope of the right to social security. 
Moreover, it is argued that the legislator is obliged to do so. Provisions of the internation-
al legal instruments prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of nationality, especially 
in contributory schemes, and equal treatment of the EU nationals, have to be respected.
As a consequence, social security rights, stemming from social insurance schemes 
are covering also non-nationals, if they meet the eligibility conditions. In addition, no 
permanent residence in Slovenia is required to be socially insured. Such conditions might 
be set in non-contributory schemes, like social assistance and family benefits schemes. 
But also there, Union nationals have to be treated the same way as Slovenian nationals. 
Material scope of the right to social security is neither defined nor fully determined 
in the Constitution. There is also no codification of social security law. Hence, this vague 
and multi layered notion has to be filled by the legal science and (constitutional) jurispru-
dence with its case-law. The Constitutional Court acknowledged that the right to social 
security presents a very complex structure of possible contents and relations, dictated by 
various circumstances. The constitutionality review is therefore necessarily reserved and 
restricted to the test, whether the legislator’s solution is in accordance with public inter-
est. The Constitution gives the legislator a possibility to choose between the measures 
available that are appropriate to meet his obligations. At the same time the legislator is 
bound to respect fundamental rights and general constitutional principles. 
As in some other continental European states, also in Slovenia the main path to ex-
ercise the right to social security is social insurance. Slovenian Constitution explicitly 
determines the obligation of the State to regulate mandatory health, pension, invalidity 
and other social insurance, and ensure its proper functioning. Although, only some social 
insurance branches are mentioned, enumeration is not exhaustive, since (all) other social 
insurance branches enjoy constitutional protection as well. The legislator has introduced 
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next to mandatory health, pension and invalidity insurance, also unemployment insur-
ance and parental care insurance, which have been assessed by the Constitutional Court. 
Under discussion is also separate long-term care insurance. 
The Constitution stresses that insurance has to be mandatory and social. The State 
has to introduce and supervise insurance which is characterised not only by the principle 
of mutuality, but principle of solidarity as well. It is argued that the legislator could not 
fulfil his obligation by obliging the citizens to conclude private insurance contracts for 
social risks. Next to being mandatory and social, social insurance remains based on the 
insurance principle. It is argued that introducing solely national protection (in a form of 
national pensions or national health service) or only social assistance schemes, would go 
against the constitution.
Despite of these restrictions, the legislator has a wide field of discretion to determine 
the rights and obligations of legal subjects involved in the social insurance relation. For 
instance, it determines which rights should be provided, eligibility conditions, scope of 
rights, i.e. their level and duration, the amount of contributions to be paid, number and 
internal structure of insurance carriers.
One of the recent decisions of the Constitutional Court is emphasising the social in-
surance relation established in mandatory (social) health insurance. Sickness cash benefit 
has to be provided by the employer, as s rule for the first 30 days of absence from work. 
After that it is provided from the funds of the mandatory health insurance carrier (Zavod 
za zdravstveno zavarovanje Slovenije-ZZZS). However, it still has to be paid by the em-
ployer, who may ask for the refund from the ZZZS. The Court argued that the possibility 
of insured person to claim sickness cash benefit only from his/her employer, even when 
it has to be paid by the ZZZS, is against the constitutional right to social security. Prob-
lems could arise, if the employer was insolvent, and the worker was directed to the public 
guarantee fund, without direct claim against the ZZZS.
The decision caused modifications of the Labour relations act and the Rules of man-
datory health insurance. Now a direct claim at the ZZZS is available, but only if the em-
ployer has no possibility to pay his workers. Otherwise, the employer still has to pay the 
sickness cash benefit and ask for refund from the ZZZS. Hence, it is clear that it cannot be 
the employer’s choice not to deal with his workers in the case of sickness, and leave them 
to seek their right at the ZZZS alone. Employers still have all the information required to 
pay the sickness cash benefit. The other option would be that the ZZZS collects more in-
formation and pays the sickness cash benefit directly. In either case, no excessive burden 
should be transferred to the workers. 
From 2004 the constitutional right to social security was amended and one of the 
social security rights is now expressly mentioned, i.e. the right to a pension. Legal value 
of such addition was questioned at first, since the Constitution already mentions manda-
tory (social) pension insurance, which obviously enough has to provide a pension to 
active, insured persons, based on their contributions and proportional to their wages. Ad-
ditionally, the Constitution does not define the notion pension. It may encompass various 
pensions based on contributions, including old-age, widow/er’s or family pension. The 
constitution cannot determine the eligibility conditions and the exact scope of the right 
to a pension is the task of the legislator. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court used the 
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opportunity and provided not only social security, but also property protection argument 
(discussed below) to secure the right to a pension.
It is argued that one of the deficiencies of the Slovenian Constitution might be no 
express guarantee of the right to social assistance. However, the Constitutional Court as-
certained that an individual or a family without sufficient resources enjoys constitutional 
protection. It has linked a constitutional social state principle with a fundamental human 
right to social security in order to establish the duty of the State to provide the endangered 
individual appropriate assistance. It also recognised that personal dignity could be invad-
ed, when changes to the pension and invalidity insurance scheme would lead to poverty 
of the claimant. In this case his/her freedom, protected by the right to personal dignity 
and safety, could become questionable.48 It is also clear that the legislator perceives social 
assistance scheme as an integral part of the Slovenian social security system.
3.2. Other fundamental social rights important for social security position  
of an individual
Slovenian Constitution acknowledges not only the right to social security, but also 
some other social rights. Among them is the right to health care. It is not limited to na-
tionals, since everyone has the right to health care, under the conditions determined by 
law (it can be guaranteed from public and private means). The State is rather hesitant to 
precisely determine the right to health care in its Constitution, as it could turn out to be a 
large investment.
It could be argued, that the right to health care supplements and broadens the consti-
tutional right to social security, which is exercised also by mandatory health insurance. 
It is the duty of the State to guarantee all forms of access to health care, among them 
geographic, financial, timely, informational and procedural access to high quality health 
care to everyone.
Slovenian Constitution confers special rights to disabled persons. This provision is 
broader than the right to social security, which is exercised also via the invalidity in-
surance. The State is under obligation to provide protection and work training not only 
to work invalids, i.e. those who acquired the rights under the mandatory invalidity in-
surance, but also all other disabled persons. This provision should enable the inclusion 
of disabled persons into the life of the society. The constitutional obligation to provide 
special protection to disabled children and severely disabled persons is partially met by 
providing such protection in the social security system. 
The constitutional obligation of the State to protect family, motherhood, fatherhood, 
children and youth, and to create proper conditions for this protection have to be consid-
ered also when the legislator introduces modifications of social security rights.
48  Constitutional Court Decisions Nos. U-I–330/97, 30.11.2000, OdlUS IX, 281 and U-I–36/00, 
11.12.2003, OdlUS, XII, 98.
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4. Slovenia as a state governed by the rule of law
Slovenia is not only social state, but also state governed by the rule of law. This prin-
ciple or argument has been extensively construed by the Constitutional Court and many 
sub-principles were deducted from it. It proved to be of importance also when reshaping 
social security rights.
4.1. Adjustment of the law to social relations
Even before the economic recession and especially during it, the social security law 
is subject of many modifications and amendments. It can be argued that it is one of the 
most rapidly changing areas of law. When the social security system wants to fulfil its ba-
sic task and provide security to the people, it has to be adapted to continuously changing 
society. Also the Slovenian Constitutional Court recognises the principle of adjustment of 
the law to social relations as one of the principles of the state governed by the rule of law. 
The legislator does not only have the right, but is under obligation to modify and ament 
legislative acts in the social security field, if that is dictated by the changed relations in 
the society.49
Social security rights have to be faithful companion of every member of the society 
from his/her birth (or even before, with benefits to a pregnant women), during the life 
time (with benefits during the periods of sickness, invalidity, unemployment or rearing 
of children) and even after that (with certain benefits to family members of a deceased 
socially insured person). The Slovenian Constitutional Court argues (using the example 
of pensions) that social security (in the form of social insurance) has to provide continuity 
of the standard of living.50 Cash benefits have to be proportional to income from which 
the contributions have been paid. Suitable (not only minimum) protection has to be pro-
vided, in order to prevent poverty and social exclusion and enable free development of 
each individual and the society.
4.2. Protection of vested rights
Although modifications are required, the same principle of the state governed by the 
rule of law requires that vested rights and rights in course of acquisition are preserved to 
a certain extent. Thus, if social security is to provide real security, people should be able 
to rely on it and should be protected in their rights and legal expectations.51
Such protection is guaranteed by the principle of trust in law, deducted by the Con-
stitutional Court from the state governed by the rule of law principle. It guarantees to the 
individual that the State will not worsen his/her position arbitrary, without sound reason, 
founded on a predominated and legitimate public interest.
49  Constitutional Court decisions Nos. U-I–69/03, 20.10.2005, OdlUS XIV, 75 and U-I–307/11, 
1.12.2011, Official Journal RS, Nr. 100/11 and 36/12.
50  Constitutional Court decisions No. U-II–1/11, 14.03.2011, Official Journal RS, Nr. 20/2011.
51  Pieters, Zaglmayer, 2006, p. 3.
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Slovenian Constitution allows that some provisions of the law may have retroactive 
effect (ex tunc), but only if that is in public interest and already acquired rights are not 
invaded.52 Hence, already acquired rights are explicitly protected by the Constitution. 
However, this does not mean that they cannot be changed for the future (ex nunc). The 
condition is that changes do not oppose the constitutional principles and other constitu-
tional provisions, including the principle of trust in law. Therefore, the scope of rights 
determined by law may be diminished by law, but only with validity for the future and 
taking into account the right to social security.
The principle of trust in law is neither an explicit constitutional principle nor is it a 
constitutional right. The latter enjoy stricter constitutional protection against possible 
limitations and other intrusions.53 Therefore, the principle of trust in law does not enjoy 
absolute protection and may to a larger extent be subject to certain limitations. In case of 
its collision with other constitutional principles or rights, it should be weighed in the pro-
cess of balancing of values, to determine which of the constitutionally guaranteed values 
should be given priority in each case.
For instance, the Constitutional Court established that in the case of relative dimin-
ishment or slower increase of pensions as expected according to the former legislation, 
the principle of legal certainty or trust in law was affected. However, the intervention has 
been urgent to secure other principle or value of public interest, which should be given 
priority. The burden of the active generation (and the economy in general) to finance 
pensions should not be of a proportion to make economic growth impossible and disturb 
the acceptable relation between the active and the retired generations. Intrusion into the 
principle of trust in law was therefore seen as admissible. It was necessary and it was 
not excessive. The Court argued that otherwise it might come to unbearable differences 
between the active and the retired generations and serious breach of the social state prin-
ciple.54
The question of intrusion into vested right was raised also during the economic reces-
sion (in 2012), when the right to a state pension was abolished, also of persons who were 
already receiving it. The argument was that the it was a specific form of social assistance 
for elderly, financed out of the state budget and not social insurance based right. As such 
it was not protected by the Constitution. Distinctive forms of social assistance should be 
interchangeable and the legislator is responsible to choose the most appropriate ones. 
Recipients of the abolished state pension could be entitled to social assistance or newly 
shaped supplementary allowance. Although the mere abolishment of the right (without 
constructing any new right) was criticised, the Constitutional Court did not have a chance 
to evaluate constitutionality of such legislative decision. One of the reasons might be 
that social assistance recipients are less active with (constitutional) enforcement of their 
rights.
52  Article 155 of the Slovenian Constitution.
53  Article 15 of the Slovenian Constitution.
54  Constitutional Court decisions Nos. U-I–31/96, 26.11.1998, OdlUS VII, 212, U-I–150/94, 15.06.1995, 
OdlUS IV, 63, and U-I–277/05, 9.02.2006, OdlUS XV, 15.
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4.3. Protection of legal expectations
Not only acquired rights, but also legal expectations and promise of future social se-
curity rights enjoy constitutional protection to a certain extent. Slovenian Constitutional 
Court emphasised that an individual may not relay on the fact that the law is never going 
to be changed. Legal expectations are safeguarded indirectly, taking into account the 
principle of trust in law and the principle of equality.
When the legislator encroaches upon the right in course of acquisition (the so called 
retrospective effect), it is not allowed to act arbitrarily. It is bound to choose appropriate 
and proportionate changes, which conform to set objectives and the principle of equity. 
When weighing the constitutional values it is important, on one hand, to estimate the 
significance of the expected right for the life of the affected person and the importance of 
the change. On the other hand it is important to define whether changes were relatively 
foreseeable and the affected persons could expect the law to change.55
In order to protect legal expectations, the new legislative act has to regulate appropri-
ate transitional periods. They have to be longer when modifying benefits which required 
longer qualifying periods and are provided for a longer period of time, like pensions. The 
Constitutional Court argued that pension insurance cannot tolerate quick radical changes. 
Reforms may be adopted only for the future and with a longer transitional period.56 For 
instance, the minimum age for acquiring an old-age pension for women is progressively 
raised and the pension calculation base is progressively prolonged, since the latest pen-
sion reform, applicable from the beginning of 2013.
Longer adjustment period is required to respect the principle of trust into law. The 
length of the transitional period may be dependent on the nature of the change. Hence, 
the duration of the transitional period for each individual change cannot be ascertained 
on beforehand.57 Transitional periods are rather important when the new legislative act is 
reducing social security benefit. If they are sufficiently long, the foreseeability of action 
is guaranteed and unequal treatment and disproportional burdening of certain generations 
of insured persons, prevented.58
Modifications of the transitional period before its expiration are also possible. How-
ever, it should not be altered soon after it was adopted nor should it be changed very 
often. If the legal situation of insured persons would be worsened again rather quickly, 
the constitutional principles of trust into law and equality could be breached, as well as 
the essence of right to social security invaded.59 The Constitutional Court also argued that 
although the principle of the state governed by the rule of law obliges the legislator to 
adjust the law to social relations, new changes to the legislation should not be done in a 
55  In the Decision No. U-I–31/96, 26.11.1998, OdlUS VII, 212, the Constitutional Court argued that in 
the case of valorisation of pensions, changes of the law are not a rare occurrence. Strban, 2010, p. 412.
56  For instance Slovenian Constitutional Court decisions Nos. U-I–29/96, 8.05.1997, OdlUS VI, 56 and 
U-I–86/96, 12.12.1996, OdlUS V, 176.
57  Constitutional Court decision No. U-II–1/11, 10.03.2011, Official Journal RS, No. 20/2011.
58  Bubnov Škoberne, Strban, 2010, p. 201.
59  Strban, 2010, p. 416.
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very short period after the initial changes to the same legislation were introduced, as this 
may breach the constitutional equality principle.60
4.4. Proportionality of legislative measures
When the legislator is modifying the scope of social security rights, he has to respect 
the principle of proportionality. It prohibits excessive legislative measures and was devel-
oped by the Constitutional Court from the constitutional provision on the state governed 
by the rule of law. The legislator is not entirely free when limiting human rights, includ-
ing the right to social security.
The principle of proportionality is applied in two steps. First is the so called legiti-
macy test. It should be verified that the goal pursued by the State is legitimate, i.e. sub-
stantively justified, and the measures used by the State are legally admissible as such.
In the second step the quality of applied measures is tested and the adequate (legally 
correct) proportion between the goal and the measure is ascertained. This is the so called 
proportionality test. It consists of weighing whether the chosen measures are appropriate 
(the pursued goal can be achieved by using them), necessary (there is no lenient meas-
ure at the legislator’s disposal to achieve the set goal), and proportionate to the value of 
pursued goal (the benefits that will result thereof). This principle of proportionality in the 
narrower sense should ensure proportionate relation between the burden, i.e. intrusion 
in the constitutional right of an individual (socially insured person), and the advantage 
gained (to protect rights of others and thus public interest).
Only, if all of these conditions are met, the legislator is allowed to intrude in the con-
stitutional right. This test was often applied by the Constitutional Court, when changes to 
the social security system were introduced. In some, it was established that legislative ac-
tion when changing the pension and invalidity insurance was based on the legitimate goal 
and the measures to achieve it were reasonable and proportionate.61 In others annulled 
certain modifications of the pension and invalidity insurance act, because the reasonable 
and direct relation to the legislator’s goal and used measure could not be established.62
4.5. Clarity and precision of legal rules
When the legislator is allowed to change individual’s legal position, he may do so 
only with clear and precise legal rules. Individual’s future behaviour and legal position 
has to be foreseeable, and legal certainty as an important element of the rule of law princi-
ple has to be guaranteed. The Constitutional Court reviewed certain legislative provisions 
also in the social security field.
It argued that legislative solutions have to be general and abstract. Their purpose 
should be clear, and the measures to achieve it accurately described. The legislator has 
60  Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I–69/03, 20.10.2005, OdlUS XIV, 75.
61  Constitutional Court decisions Nos. 150/94, 15.06.1995, OdlUS IV, 63, and 83/03, 15.09.2005, not 
published.
62  For instance Constitutional Court decisions No. U-I–29/96, 8.05.1997, OdlUS VII, 3 and OdlUS 
VI, 56.
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to pass clear legal rules and determine their content. It is not admissible to leave such 
clear determination to some other body. If the norm is not clearly defined, the danger of 
different application of the law and arbitrariness of the social security administration, 
which decides on social security rights, may be present. The legislative act is in line with 
the Constitution, if its content can be determined by using grammatical and teleological 
interpretation and action of the bodies that have to apply it is clearly defined.63
Conversely, if with the application of the interpretation tools, clear content of the 
challenged rule could not be determined and the behaviour of bodies deciding on the 
social security rights could not be foreseeable, then such legal rule is contrary to the rule 
of law principle.64 It seems that especially in the field of mandatory health insurance 
legislative action is inadequate. The legislator leaves the determination of rights and du-
ties of involved legal subject to the rules and regulations passed by the mandatory health 
insurance carrier (with consent of the minister of health).65
In this sense, the Constitutional Court did not allow a so called naked mandate (i.e. 
a mandate without further instructions, guidelines and frameworks) of the legislative act 
to the mandatory health insurance carrier in order to determine lump-sum contributions 
for certain groups of insured persons. It establishes that legislative rule is not allowed to 
leave an independent regulation of rights and duties to the executive branch regulation, 
without precise grounds in the legislative act.66
Constitutional Court decisions concern not only financing side of social security, but 
also the benefits side. One of the latest decisions was passed recently, again concerning 
the regulation of mandatory health insurance. It concerned the right to health care outside 
of Slovenia.
Slovenian legislator recognises the right of mandatory health insured persons to 
health care abroad, which is regulated in a more detailed manner in the Rules of manda-
tory health insurance.67 The Constitutional Court argued in its decision68 that until the last 
amendment (which transposed the Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ 
rights in cross-border healthcare),69 the Health care and health insurance act (ZZVZZ) 
enshrined the right to health care abroad without any limitation.70 Its delegation to more 
precise regulation in the executive branch rules and regulations was found to be against 
the constitutional rights of social security and health care. The Constitutional Court es-
tablished that it is for the legislative act to determine the scope of rights (including their 
limitations) and it is not admissible to do so originally in the Rules of mandatory health 
insurance.
63  Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I–282/94 18.10.1995, OdlUS IV, 108 (unemployment insur-
ance).
64  Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I–279/00, 16.01.2003, OdlUS XII, 1 (mandatory health insur-
ance).
65  Strban, 2005, p. 151.
66  Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I–390/02, 16.06.2005, OdlUS XIV, 58.
67  Official Journal RS, No. 79/1994 – 25/2014.
68  Decision No. Up–1303/11, U-I–25/14, 21.03.2014. Official Journal RS, No. 25/2014.
69  So called the Patient mobility Directive, OJ L 88/45, 4.04.2011.
70  Article 23/1 point 2 of the Health care and health insurance act (Zakon o zdravstvenem varstvu in 
zdravstvenem zavarovanju – ZZVZZ), Official Journal RS, No. 9/1992, last amendment in 91/2013.
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With this decision the Constitutional Court protected the right to health care abroad, 
but also opened many questions. For instance, did before the last amendment of the 
ZZVZZ insured persons have an unlimited right to (necessary and planned) health care 
abroad, also for the benefits not covered under the Slovenian mandatory health insurance 
(like helicopter transport)? Such, broad construction of the right would not be appropri-
ate. It is enshrined in the ZZVZZ, which is regulating the rights from mandatory health 
insurance (in Slovenia and the same rights abroad). In addition, limitation of financial 
responsibility of the member state of insurance to cover medical treatment in another 
(EU) member state exists only for benefits covered under its legislation (regardless the 
legal instrument used, i.e. social security coordination Regulations or Patient mobility 
Directive).
The question of validity of already decided cases by the ZZVZZ and social court, 
which have become final before the decision of the Constitutional court was taken, might 
become questionable. However, there are limited possibilities for their review. Distinc-
tive decisions after annulment part of the Rules of mandatory health insurance may lead 
to unequal treatment of insured persons. More generally, the validity of entire Rules 
might become questionable. Although, slightly formalistic decision of the Constitutional 
Court, it is a good incentive for the legislator to regulate the rights from mandatory health 
insurance in a more precise manner. At the end, this may improve the legal position of 
socially insured persons.
5. Equality of treatment
Principle of equality is one of the fundamental constitutional norms.71 In ensures the 
right of the individual to equality in the law and before the law, i.e. when the law is be-
ing applied. It is argued that together with the principle of the state governed by the rule 
of law and the social state principle, it presents the realisation of the principle of justice 
(equity) in the Constitution. The equality principle is one of the most common arguments 
used by the parties before the Constitutional Court.
It is settled case-law of the Court that the principle of equality could not be under-
stood as simple general equality of all, but as equal treatment of equal factual situations. 
The principle of equal treatment does not mean that the law should not regulate the posi-
tion of legal subjects differently. It means that this should not be done arbitrarily, without 
sound and valid reason. The principle of equality binds the legislator to regulate equal 
situations in an equal way and dissimilar situations in a distinct way.
The Constitutional Court evaluates the admissibility of the impact on the right to 
equality according to the arbitrarity test (and not according to stricter test of proportional-
ity, where inter alia the necessity of intrusion for the safeguarding of the rights of others 
must be demonstrated). For the admissibility of intrusion, any non-arbitrary, i.e. sound 
and from the nature of the matter derived reason for distinction suffices.
In many cases the Constitutional Court found no breach of the Constitution and re-
jected the claim. For instance, such decisions in the field of social security were issued 
71  Article 14 of the Slovenian Constitution.
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when different professional groups were treated distinctively,72 when elderly unemployed 
were provided special protection,73 or when the legislator distinguished between men and 
women in pension insurance.74
Allowing women to be entitled to an old-age pension earlier than men was found in 
accordance with the Constitution. The Court argued that distinction based on gender is 
allowed, when it serves to establishment of substantive (material) equality between gen-
ders, where there are objective biological or functional differences. In this case the legis-
lator is not only bound by the prohibition of discrimination, but (in particular) by the duty 
of positive action. Discrimination is thus allowed when the equalisation of disadvantages 
is based on traditionally and historically distinctive social roles.75
This decision was taken decade and a half ago, and it might be interesting to see 
how the Court would react today, especially after the new pension reform was passed at 
the end of 2012. Women and men are as a rule treated equally in relation to qualifying 
conditions, but the distinction remained when calculating the pension. The question may 
be, whether distinctive calculation is in line with Directive 79/7/EEC,76 since this excep-
tion is not explicitly mentioned in its Article 7. The Court of Justice of the EU argued 
that Article 7(1)(a) of the Directive entitles the Member State concerned to calculate the 
amount of pension differently depending on the worker’s sex, if national legislation has 
maintained a different pensionable ages for women and men.77 However, when national 
legislation has abolished the difference in pensionable ages, Member States are no longer 
authorised to maintain a difference according to sex in the method of calculating the 
pension.78
In some other decisions the Constitutional Court annulled some of the provisions 
of the law, because they were discordant with the constitutional principle of equality. 
For instance, setting self-employed in a worse position compared to employed persons 
concerning the right to a partial pension79 or social security rights of disabled persons 
(of category III invalidity),80 permanent residence of the child as one of the eligibility 
conditions for acquiring the right to child benefit,81 or citizenship of the child to calculate 
certain period of child rearing into pension insurance period82 were found to breach the 
constitutional equality principle.
72  E.g. decisions Nos. U-I–307/98, 5.12.2002, OdlUS XI, 252 (pension and invalidity insurance), and 
U-I–66/98, 18.04.2002, OdlUS XI, 68 (child benefit).
73  Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I–282/94, 18.10.1995, OdlUS IV, 108.
74  On gender differences in social protection Strban, 2012/1.
75  Decision No. U-I–298/96, 11.11.1999. OdlUS, VIII, 246.
76  Directive 79/7/EEC on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men 
and women in matters of social security, OJ L 6, 10.01.1979.
77  Distinctive calculation has to be necessary and objectively linked to the difference in retirement age. 
Joined Cases C–377/96 to C–384/96 De Vriendt and Others [1998] ECR I–2105.
78  Case C–154/92 Van Cant [1993] ECR I–3811.
79  Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I–358/04, 19.10.2006, OdlUS XV, 72.
80  Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I–40/09, 4.03.2010, Official Journal RS, No. 27/2010.
81  Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I–31/04, 1.12.2005, OdlUSXIV, 86.
82  Constitutional Court Decision No. U-I–273/01, 18.11.2004, OdlUS, XIII, 78.
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6. Threats to and protection of social security rights in the times  
of economic crisis
In Slovenia the economic crisis or even recession persisted for quite a long period 
of time. Fiscal policy was focusing on reducing public spending, which included cutting 
back social security rights. However, there was strong opposition, especially from trade 
unions and the first proposal of reforming the pension and invalidity insurance was reject-
ed at the referendum in 2011.83 In 2012 economic activity in Slovenia further declined by 
2.3 per cent, according to the report of the Slovenian Institute of macroeconomic analysis 
and development.84 However, in 2014 the good news was that in the last quarter of 2013 
the gross domestic product increased for 2.1 percent.85
During the economic crisis, some, relatively modest measured were undertaken, for 
instance increasing the pensionable age to 65 years (or 60 with at least 40 years of quali-
fying period), different calculation of pensions (which may under certain circumstances 
fall below 40 per cent if reductions for early retirement are taken into account, which 
may be questioned from the ILO minimum standards point of view),86 no indexation of 
pensions, which was prolonged in years 2014 and 201587 (and they will never reach the 
same levels again).88 In addition a general tax relief for persons aged 65 or more when 
determining the personal income tax has been abolished at the end of 2013.
Conversely, more benefits have been introduced for unemployed workers, like spe-
cial rules apply to younger unemployed persons, i.e. those below 30 years of age. Instead 
of nine months, six months of unemployment insurances (in the same period, i.e. last 
24 months) suffices for acquiring an unemployment benefit. However, entitlement lasts 
only for two months (normally from three to 12 months or longer for older unemployed 
persons). It might be questioned whether this is in line with the ILO Convention No. 102 
on minimum standards of social security. According to the Convention, minimum dura-
tion of unemployment benefit should be at least 13 weeks (which is app. three months).89 
Additionally the entitlement of paying pension contributions for elderly unemployed 
persons, who have exhausted the right to unemployment benefit, was prolonged from 
one year to two years, if a person could retire in this period. However, the entitlement is 
limited ratione temporis until March 2018.
For the first three months of unemployment, the unemployment benefit was increased 
to 80 per cent of the calculation base (average salary in last eight months), for the next 
nine months it was reduced to 60 per cent and after a year it is only 50 per cent of the 
83  Strban, 2011, p. 2.
84  More at http://www.umar.gov.si/en/, May 2014.
85  More at http://www.stat.si/, May 2014.
86  ILO Convention No. 102 on minimum standards of social security advocates pension level of at least 
40 per cent (Article 67). Novak et al., 2006, p. 375.
87  Article 56 of the Implementation of the Republic of Slovenia Budget for 2014 and 2015 Act 
(ZIPRS1415, Official Journal RS, Nr. 101/2013).
88  Pensions are (partially) adjusted to the increase in wages. It was argued that in the time of economic 
crises, pensions could be increasing. The reason may be that many low paid workers lost their jobs and the 
average wage increased. Such effect was prevented by not adjusting pension amounts during the economic 
crisis. But this may affect persons with low pensions (mostly women) to a larger extent. Strban, 2012/1, p. 31.
89  Article 24 of the ILO Convention No. 102.
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calculation base. The legal situation has deteriorated the most for elderly unemployed 
persons, who are entitled to unemployment benefit for more than year. However, they 
have more difficulties for finding a job and should enjoy more, not less protection.
Social security rights are protected by already analysed general constitutional prin-
ciples, like the social state, state governed by the rule of law, and equality principles, as 
well as fundamental social rights. Next to that the constitutional guarantee of the right 
to private property90 is gaining importance in protecting social security rights (especially 
from contributory schemes, and in particular pensions). This might be important, since 
traditional concepts of private property usually afford the best legal protection.
Slovenia is bound by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)91 and its 
interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The latter has already 
applied the property protection arguments92 to social security rights. It considered a so-
cial security right as pecuniary right without it being necessary to rely solely on the link 
between entitlement to social security right and the obligation to pay taxes or other con-
tributions.93 The ECtHR has gone even further and recognised property protection also to 
non-contributory rights,94 which was not undisputed.
Also the Slovenian Constitutional Court has confirmed the double nature of the right 
to a pension. It is protected with the constitutional right to social security as well as the 
right to private property.95 The latter is broader from the civil law concepts of property. 
It is guarantee that provides freedom of a person with respect to his/her property.96 The 
Court broadened the personal scope of the constitutional right to social security (or at 
least to a pension)97 also to non-Slovenian citizens.
The Constitutional Court argued that the constitutional essence of the rights to a pen-
sion is the right of a person to receive a pension (under reasonably set conditions) which 
provides social security.98 It established that the Constitution cannot guarantee a pension 
at a certain level, but the pension has to be proportional to income from which the con-
tributions were paid. It cannot be reduced to a social assistance minimum.99 It went even 
further and found that the possibility of an employer to negotiate deferment, payment in 
instalment or writ-off of social security contributions may be to the detriment of a worker 
and is against the constitutional right to private property.100
90  Article 33 of the Constitution.
91  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Eu-
rope, Rome 1950.
92  C.f. Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR.
93  E.g. Gaygusuz v. Austria (16.09.1996, Reports 1996-IV), also Klein v. Austria, no. 57028/00, 
3.03.2011, final 30. 6. 2011.
94  Koua Poirrez v. France, no. 40892/98, 30. 9. 2003, final 30.12.2003, Reports 2003-X. Kapuy, Pieters, 
Zaglmayer, p. 278.
95  Constitutional Court decision No. Up–770/06, 27.05.2009, Official Journal RS, No. 54/2009, also 
U-II–1/11, 10.03.2011, Official Journal RS 20/2011.
96  Constitutional Court decision No. Up–156/98, 11.02.1999, OdlUS VIII, 118.
97  The Constitutional Court used the property argument with regard not only to an old-age, but also to 
widow/er’s pension (Up–1419/08, 22.10.2009, OdlUS XVIII, 87). 
98  Constitutional Court decision No. Up–360/05, 2.10.2008, OdlUS XVII, 85.
99  Constitutional Court decision No. U-II–1/11, 10.03.2011, Official Journal RS, No. 20/2011.
100  Constitutional Court decision No. U-I–281/09, 22.11.2011, OdlUS XIX, 29.
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7. Development of social security rights de lege/constitutione ferenda
Social security rights will have to be developed and adjusted to ever changing social 
relations also after the economic crisis. In Slovenia there is a discussion on long term care 
insurance. Long-term care benefits are very diverse across Europe and there is hardly any 
common definition. In Slovenian social security system persons reliant on long-term care 
might be entitled to distinctive benefits in kind and in cash, ranging from social insurance 
to social assistance and social compensation schemes. Benefits in kind are provided in a 
form of social services (home, semi-residential and residential care) or linked with health 
services in recently established nursing hospitals.
Cash benefits are paid directly to a person reliant on long-term care. How the money 
will be spent (will a formal or informal caregiver be paid or will it be saved for future 
days) is in the discretion of the recipient. Assistance and attendance allowance is provid-
ed to (old-age, invalidity, widow/er´s or family) pension recipients in two levels. Similar 
one is granted to social assistance recipients, disabled persons not entitled benefits from 
invalidity insurance and war invalids. Special family benefits are provided to parents of 
children reliant on long-term care.
Problems of a mixed system could be that the overview of long-term care benefits 
might be lost, since they are linked to health care, pensions, disabled children, social 
assistance etc. In addition, no common social policy could be developed. Therefore, reli-
ance on long-term care has been recognized not as a completely new, but as independent 
social risk in the proposal for the new legislative act.101
New social insurance branch should be established, but long-term care insurance 
should be linked to mandatory health insurance (and its carrier). For instance, it should 
suffice that the reliance on long-term care is expected to last for at least three months and 
at least four hours a day. No levels of reliance on long-term care are foreseen. Instead, the 
long-term care coordinator (of the insurance carrier) should organize care and propose an 
individual plan of long-term care in cooperation with the beneficiary and his or her fam-
ily. Priority should be given to benefits in kind, provided by contracted providers. This 
way, a double social risk might be avoided, i.e. at the person reliant on care and person 
(usually female family member) providing it.102
Introducing long-term care insurance would fit under already existing constitutional 
provisions, mentioning also other social insurances. However, if more drastic modifi-
cations of social security rights would be proposed, the constitution would have to be 
changes as well. One of such proposals, which at the end did not find its way into the 
governmental coalition agreement, concerns the universal basic income.
There are still some open questions, how should universal basic income look like 
(should it be unconditional or not), who should be entitled, which social security schemes 
should be abolished (social assistance, family benefits, unemployment, or even pension 
insurance), and what should be its level? For the moment the arguments that universal 
basic income is neither suited to social security benefits in kind, nor to distinctive legal 
101  The proposal was prepared by the Ministry of labour, family, social affairs and equal opportunities 
in 2010.
102  Strban, 2012/2.
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positions of persons entitled to social security rights, and that lump-sum payment could 
cause more inequalities than introduce equality, prevail. For the moment there is no con-
crete legislative proposal or proposal to modify the constitution accordingly. It is argued 
that effort should be invested and adjust the already existing social security rights.
8. Concluding thoughts
In the times of economic recession, in many countries social security rights were at 
the frontline of austerity measures. In Slovenia, cuts in social security rights were rather 
important, but at the same time not excessive. When many legislative acts are modified, 
or new are adopted, more questions on their harmony with constitutional principles and 
values could be raised. Hence, the constitutional protection of social security rights is 
tested more often in the times of crisis.
Legal position of the individual is better protected, if the State has to respect not 
only the social state principle (which may be broader that social security, touching upon 
the regulation of taxes, housing benefits, labour and education rights) and fundamental 
social rights, but other principles and human rights as well. Among them are the most 
relevant the equality and the rule of law principles (protecting also legal expectations and 
preventing drastic changes during the recession periods) and the right to private property. 
The latter might be important I purely internal situations, but also when people move to a 
country with which no social security coordination instrument exists. 
However, also the Constitution may have its limits and might not afford complete 
protection. For instance in the Slovenian Constitution the right to social security is limit-
ed to Slovenian citizens, there is no mentioning of social assistance or equal treatment of 
same sex partners (explicitly so in the EU law). In addition, there are no minimum stand-
ards of social security rights prescribed by the constitution. Therefore, the interpretation 
of constitutional provisions by the Constitutional Court (and social courts) is of utmost 
importance. It has to be dynamic and adjusted to the modified social relations. Constitu-
tional guarantees are only as much effective as they are protected by the Constitutional 
Court as the guardian of the Constitution.
Moreover, it seems that social security rights are best protected, if not only constitu-
tional and EU law provisions are respected, but also minimum standards of the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation and the Council of Europe are ratified and applied. Only this 
way the duty of the State to provide security to its citizens, including social security, can 
be fulfilled.
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Summary
In Slovenia there are several constitutional provisions, which are rather important for shaping the 
social security system and limiting the legislator when he wishes to reduce the (personal and/or ma-
terial) scope of social security rights. In Slovenia its meaning has been explained by the Slovenian 
Constitutional Court and legal theory, although, to far lesser extent than the principle of the state 
governed by the rule of law.
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